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Some Problems in Soviet-American War Termination:
Cross/Cultural Asymmetries
Are all thy conquests,
Glories, triumphs, Spoils,
Shrunk to this little measure?
Shakespeare
Introduction
This paper explores the problems of interpreting cross-
cultural signals (semiotics) about war and war termination
through the method of analysis of strategic (politico/military)
cultures. In doing so, it provides a possible basis for predic-
tion of some aspects of the Soviet/American military competition
in the uncertain period of perestroyka .
The methodology of this approach is experimental. Its
usefulness depends upon raising new and important insights into
the most critical problem the world might face. Its excuse is
that it explores some intellectual territory not frequently
examined in studies of war termination, departing from the
studies which tend to be based on the structure, logic and
preconceptions of Western strategic culture. 1
1 As Keith Dunn wrote about the papers presented at a
conference on the subject: "The major conclusion that can be
drawn from the conference dialogue which generated this volume,
and from the papers that appear in this book, is that U.S.
thought concerning conflict termination is not well developed or
coherent." Keith A. Dunn, "The Missing Link in Conflict Termina-
tion Thought: Strategy," Conflict Termination and Military
Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion and War , Stephen J. Cimbala and
Keith A. Dunn, editors, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 175.
2As the purpose of such an investigation is to increase our
ability in military prediction and control, we will use the
method of examining, especially, cultural asymmetries, areas in
which a concept (war termination itself, for example) in one
society distorts its mirror-image in another. Jacob Kipp
expressed the idea exactly in writing that:
Socio-political asymmetries give rise to doctrinal and
strategic asymmetries, and in the Soviet view the side
which succeeds in imposing its vision upon the future
will have used foresight and forecasting decisively,
even if the competing systems never shift from deter-
rence and low intensity conflict to war-f ighting. 2
The Cultural Relativity of War Termination
The vast Western literature on "war termination" and the
comparative Soviet silence on the subject tells us something
important about the concept: it is obviously culturally relative.
That means, of course, that ideas and conceptions in one culture
do not translate into another outside of their context.
As the U.S. strategic culture is, using Edward Hall's
classification, a minimal-context one 3
,
and the Soviet strategic
2 Jacob W. Kipp, "The Methodology of Foresight and Fore-
casting in Soviet Military Affairs," (Fort Leavenworth: Soviet
Army Studies Office, undated)
,
p. 26.
3 Edward Hall, the anthropologist, uses the terms "high and
low context" to classify cultures. The Soviet Union is a high
context culture which means, in part, that it prefers to consider
phenomena in their connectedness; the U.S. is a low-context
culture, on the whole, which means that it prefers to consider
phenomena in their separateness. The categories are not meant to
be judgmental but merely descriptions of how a culture tends to
interpret reality. Because "high" and "low" tend to imply
values, I have preferred to use "multi" and "minimal" context,
but the words are meant to convey Edward Hall's ideas. See
Edward Hall, Beyond Culture
.
(New York: Anchor Books, 1976.)
3culture is a multi-context one, there is a high degree of
probability of error in the predictions of one culture about the
other. The consequences of misunderstood signals in trying to
terminate a war could be catastrophic. (The recent revelations
at a Moscow conference on the Cuban missile crisis of the US-
USSR-Cuban miscalculations and misinterpretations of intentions
provide evidence of the inter-cultural problems of signalling. 4
Although this paper is specifically about the problems of
war termination relative to Soviet and American military cul-
tures, it is also necessarily about the problems one culture has
in interpreting the signs of another. War termination, when it
is less than obliteration of the enemy, is a semiotic process;
that is, it depends upon interpreting signals. For that to
happen, equivalents in cultural understanding, not just in words,
must be transmitted and received. (Is a warning shot across the
bow an alarm or a misfire?)
For example, a navy is an elaborate semiotic system in
addition to being a weapon; however, in their cultural contexts,
the American and Soviet navies operate differently. In the
Soviet Navy where the culture emphasizes secretiveness and
surprise, the primary weapon is the submarine. In the U.S. Navy,
where the culture emphasizes visible signs, the primary weapon is
the aircraft carrier. The Maritime Strategy in its explicit
advertisement of intentions, conveyed a set of signals in a
4
"Atom Warheads Deployed in Cuba in 62, Soviets Say," New
York Times, January 29, 1989. p. 1.
4public way which the Soviet navy, in its own semiotic context,
could not have done. (There could not be secret naval war plans
divorced from a larger strategy.)
One of the ambiguities of war termination in modern condi-
tions, especially in Soviet thought where surprise plays the
crucial role, is that, semiotically, the war is ended, concep-
tually, when it is decided to fire the first salvo. The Soviets,
facing enemies superior in technology throughout much of their
history, have understood that if a first strike must be in-
itiated, it must be both a surprise and a decisive blow. The
decision to take such a step, they have repeatedly said, is
tantamount to putting an end to civilization as we know it.
Thus it is essential that the context which gives signals, such
as the Maritime Strategy, meaning are understood in each culture.
While the design of a navy, as well as all armed forces, is
the result of a far more complex process than the relatively
obvious, but fiercely debated, connections with national charac-
ter, still there are identifiable signals which are obvious.
Changes in ship construction will be among the first signs of the
new Soviet military doctrine that is now being formed. However,
these naval signals, in the past, have often been mistaken. For
example, the Soviet naval out-of-area voyages that began in the
60 's and the construction of large ASW cruisers were part of the
search for parity and a means of supporting the Brezhnev Doctrine
but not, as was so often thought, an attempt to seize control of
5the seas. ("Sea control" comes from Western strategic culture,
not Soviet. ) 5
Strategic Culture as Method
Fortunately, political (including strategic/military)
culture is being more and more widely used as one of the tools to
analyze the Soviet armed forces and their doctrine. This comes
at a critical time of major change in Soviet political life.
Just on May 15, 1988 when Soviet troops no longer pretended to
protect the "gains" of socialism in Afghanistan, it became
probable that the Brezhnev Doctrine, the most specific ideo-
logical evidence of the "threat", was no longer operative.
Further evidence for this revision was given by the Soviet
Foreign Minister, E. A. Shevernadze, who said, "The struggle
between two opposing systems is no longer the defining tendency
of the present era." 6 The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Ministry
of Defense have announced a doctrine of building forces only to
the point of sufficiency. 7
As these ideas represent radical change in a society which
has been among the world's most resistent to innovation, they can
5 Robert W. Herrick, "Roles and Missions of the Soviet
Navy: Historical Evolution, Current Priorities, and Future
Prospects," The Soviet and Other Communist Navies , ed. James L.
George, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 31.
6 Prayda, July 26, 1988, p. 4.
7
. D. T. Yazov, Na strazhe sotsializma i mira , (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1987), p. 4.
6most accurately be assessed through the lens of political
culture. While no one can say for certain which personalities
will triumph in the emerging new ruling elite, (conspiracy,
secrecy, and control are three traditional characteristics of
Soviet political culture) , it is possible, on the basis of the
cultural cycles of hundreds of years of Russian, and decades of
Soviet, political life to predict the main probabilities. We can
say for certain, for example, that the reforms will be introduced
from above and that when they meet resistance, the old forms of
repression will be renewed. The manner in which General Secret-
ary Gorbachev removed Andrei Gromyko and assumed his position
illustrates this perfectly. Russia has, after all, a three
hundred year old history of trying Western reforms, from Peter I
to Lenin, Khrushchev and now Gorbachev. There is ample
historical precedent for predicting a strong, repressive reaction
when the current efforts have either failed or run their course.
What we are emphasizing here is the structure and form in
which a culture functions more than its content, the forms that
determine the limits within which new ideas are likely to occur.
This is an especially useful approach during times like these in
the Soviet Union. If we make estimates on the basis of what we
assume is the most "reasonable" development, then we are mirror-
imaging and will be wrong. If, however, we make estimates on the
basis of the forms within which the Soviet military establishment
operates, then we will more likely be right since we will be
7dealing with the limits within which Soviets have traditionally
behaved.
This approach has been called by Margaret Mead "studying
i
cultures at a distance" and although our distance from Gor-
bachev's Russia is by no means as great as was Margaret Mead's
from Stalin's Russia, we are still confronted by the very
significant problems of understanding a heretofore secretive
empire in transition. To reestablish our bearings, we can use
the ideas from political culture which studies patterns or styles
in war, national signals and their cross/cultural interpreta-
tion. 8
Modes of Thought
The differences between the two modes of thought in terms of
ideology could hardly be more extreme. For example, Soviets, in
the Russian messianic tradition, naturally seek global solutions.
Coming from a multi-context position, they estimate their
security as depending upon the world system changing to a more
compatible structure. Even now in the period of perestroyka
.
8 The basic method for studying cultures at a distance was
developed and adapted to the Soviet Union by Margaret Mead and a
group of brilliant anthropologists and political scientists and
reported in Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority: An Interdisciplin-
ary Approach to Problems of Soviet Character , (Westport, Connec-
ticut: Greenwood Press, 1951.) Nathan Leites was the coordinator
of this program and published in the same year his seminal work,
The Operational Code of the Politburo . (New York: McGraw Hill,
1951.) Many consider The Operational Code the most significant
single system for predicting Soviet behavior.
8Gorbachev, while modifying traditional Bolshevik aggressiveness,
argues for changing the world systems of security. 9
Surprise, in the sense of seizing the initiative and
dumfounding the opposition, is a constant in Soviet military, or
negotiating, strategies. That idea, antedating the Nazi Blitz-
krieg in Soviet military art, is common to all military science.
But in Soviet strategic culture, where secrecy, deception and the
compartmentation of knowledge have played all-pervading roles,
the concept of "surprise" has a structural significance. It is a
part of Russian Weltanschauung . It is one of the many psycho-
logical techniques which the Soviets, and before them the
Russians, developed to equalize the odds in contests with enemies
superior in strength.
Thus Gorbachev's acceptance of the need for thorough
disarmament inspection at the 27th Party Congress was a signal
that a major doctrinal change was already under way not only in
military but also in political thought. 10
The idea of "surprise" is a sign in Soviet strategic culture
illustrating a significant differences between it and the U.S.
military culture. "Surprise" requires major sudden shifts and
can be used on the political, economic or military levels.
Politically as well as militarily, it is one of the signs of how
the Soviets try to change the balance of power. The U.S., on the
9 M. S. Gorbachev, "Politicheskiy doklad Tsentral 'nogo
komiteta KPSS XXVII s'ezdy Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo
soyuza", (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), p. 95.
10 Ibid.
, p. , 85.
9other hand, operating more often statically, uses surprise
comparatively less—The Maritime Strategy, for example—and
calculations of strength comparatively more.
The dynamic/static dichotomy is another frequent structural
difference between the two cultures. Soviet thought tends to
analyze history in terms of an ever-evolving conflict. There-
fore, the Soviet view of the world is one of an inherently
unstable reality. In contrast, the U.S., as frequently observed,
struggles to maintain the status quo .
The way in which this dichotomy causes views of war term-
ination to differ is significant. Whereas in the U.S. litera-
ture, the end of a war is treated as a specific condition which
can be defined in time and place, in Soviet thought, war ends
with a transformation of society. Thus, for Soviets, the idea of
war termination is inherent in the idea of politics. It is the
aim of policy as well as war, the transformation of society, the
very process of civilization.
In U.S. thought, war termination has a narrower meaning. It
is the product of specific forces. Its dimension in time is
monochronic where as the Soviet concept in polychronic. Perhaps
it is for this reason that it is so difficult to discuss the
Soviet view of war termination. The idea cannot easily be
separated out from the process of the evolution of the world
order, whereas, in the American concept, the idea can be endless-
ly discussed as the product of an equation in which the numbers
are constantly changed.
10
Another contrast between the two is in the political demands
on human life and endurance. The difference between our two
cultures was important during the years of the strategy of
Massive Retaliation since that doctrine assumed that war termina-
tion would follow predictable losses. The temptation was, of
course, to project American values onto the Soviets, although the
cultures function at opposite extremes of the scale.
The Germans were constantly astonished, in the First and
the Second World Wars, at the Russian tolerance for the in-
tolerable, at the loss of life they would accept for minor gains
such as parachute jumps without parachutes in the defense of
Moscow and infantry attacks without rifles or ammunition.H In
the Mongolian campaign against the Japanese in 1945, Marshal
Zhukov's feat in Khakin Gol in 1938 of attacking across "impass-
able" terrain was repeated by Soviet forces over the Great
Khighan Mountains.
By identifying these patterns as structural components (the
unconscious values which determine the Soviet view of reality)
,
we increase our ability to predict Soviet behavior, especially at
the extremes, such as in war termination. For example, Uri
Ra'anan has argued that Soviet maneuver in the Middle East wars
provided "almost textbook cases of Soviet behavior in war
11 A fascinating study of the German evaluation of Soviet
operations in World War II is contained in Donald S. Detwiler,
ed. , World War II German Military Studies . A Garland Series in 24
volumes, 1979, (no publisher listed), Library of Congress number
D757.W67. And see for example, B. H. Liddell Hart, (ed.), The
Red Army
. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958.)
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(initiation and) termination." 12 The game plan for the Soviet
non-combat phase is largely positional: to make it clear that
checkmate is inevitable. His characterization of Soviet be-
havior—maximum bluster with little risk, safe fall-back posi-
tions, massing hardware, etc.—follows closely the paradigm
Nathan Leites illustrated in his seminal work, The Operational
Code of the Politburo . 13 Margaret Mead in Soviet Attitudes
Toward Authority and Edward Keenan in his article, "Russian
Political Folkways," provided additional confirmation of the
possibility of predicting Soviet decisions both for war and its
end. 14 They demonstrated that there is a Soviet view of
reality, very different from that in the West, which dictates
many Soviet decisions. That this has not been perceived in the
past has led to many dangerous and expensive miscalculations,
according to Colin Gray. 15 The dominant idea, both in academia
and the military, was that "other cultures either share, or will
come to share, American values and strategic ideas. n1 ^
12 Uri Ra'anan, "Signals of War Termination", Ending a
Nuclear War: Are the Superpowers Ready? , Ed. S. Cimbala and J.
Douglass, (London: Pergamon-Brassey ' s, 1987), p. 281.
13 Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo
.
(Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1951.)
14 Margaret Mead, Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority .
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979,) and Edward Keenan, "Russian
Political Folkways," The Russian Review . July 1986.
15 Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style . (Wash-
ington: DNA Report 5814F-1, 1981), p. 96.
16 Ibid. p. 97.
12
In part, this is attributable to the different cultural
structures of thought. For example, victory in U.S. thought
tends to be perceived as a kind of technological accomplishment.
Our annual military estimates reflect that position with their
emphasis on comparative weapons capabilities and their avoidance
of ultimate political arrangements. Victory for the Soviets
tends to be perceived as a sociopolitical accomplishment in which
historical processes are stabilized.
Soviet Military Thought
The course and termination of war, in Soviet military
science, has been dependent upon certain factors and perceptions
which remained, for many years, quite constant and which have not
been renounced. The fundamental principle for the study of war
and its termination is based upon war as a reflection of its
dependence on its political goals. This basic proposition
derives:
.... from the fact that the place and role of war in the
life of society is determined by the politics of the
classes and governments conducted before and during the
war. 17
The implications of this theory, of course, are that Western,
especially U.S. political intentions are unceasingly aggressive.
This could hardly be stated more clearly than by Admiral Gorsh-
kov 18 in his preface to a book on the Soviet Navy:
17 M. M. Kiryan, Problemy voennoy teorii v sovetskikh
nauchno-spravochnvkh izdanivakh . (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), p. 134.
13
"Discussion of the presumably defensive character of
the American SDI program, putting weapons in space, is,
of course, a fairy-tale for the naive. The strategy is
to try to paralyze the Soviet strategic weapons in
order to have the capability to make an unanswered
attack on our country." 19 i
The second set of laws governing the possibilities for the
conduct and termination of war undoubtedly have a direct bearing
on the decision to adopt the doctrine of sufficient defense, for
they deal with the rear, the productive capacity of a people and
its industry. The extensive literature on the period of stagna-
tion, the problems of manpower, the lag in high-technology and
the economic crisis of the rear has its reflection in military
writing. The element of technology, industry, production and
science has been considered since Frunze the most critical in
determining the nature and outcome of war. Marshal Ogarkov took
up this theme in the 70 's when he warned of the consequences of
stagnation:
It is particularly important to understand the dialect-
ical process of developing military affairs at the
present stage, under conditions of rapid scientific and
technological progress. Tardiness in restructuring
views and stagnation in working out and implementing
new questions of military art and construction are
fraught with serious consequence. 20
Current Soviet War Doctrine
19 N. P. V'yunenko, et al., Voenno-morskoy flot; Rol '
.





20 N. V. Ogarkov, in his Istoriya uchit bditelnosti
,
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 52-54, discusses the importance of
the dialectical law of the negation of the negation on military
constrtuction and equipment. The iron law is, of course, that he
who falls behind is negated.
14
The study of the ways in which a war between the Soviet
Union and the United States might be terminated cannot proceed
very far without some information about the nature of the war
each side expects to fight, the leaders in power, the power
centers in the government and some estimate of the political
culture of the enemy. At the present time, with respect to the
Soviet Union, the answers to all of these questions, except for
the political doctrine, are either in doubt or being revised.
Victory in terms of the doctrine which is now being debated
and replaced in the Soviet Union consisted of destroying an
enemy's ability to make war and controlling [occupying] his
centers of power. That this remained the military doctrine into
1988 is confirmed in the book Navy with Admiral Gorshkov as the
editor. It describes the objectives of war as:
The political goals of war, as a rule, cannot be
reached and its victorious issue cannot be accomplished
without the destruction of the basic groupings of the
armed forces of the enemy and the occupation of all or
a significant part of its territory. 21
The kind of operation necessary to achieve this was decided-
ly offensive although from the Soviet political point of view it
was defensive, a bit of "doublespeak" routinely derided in the
West. An enemy, according to what was then called the Brezhnev
Doctrine after his speech in Prague, 1968, was anyone who
challenged the gains of socialism. The defense of those gains
was an historical imperative and therefore dialectically dic-
21 V'yunenko, p. 41.
15
tated. But in terms of strategic culture, security was also
related to the space Soviets needed to protect themselves from
weapons with long ranges.
Under the new Gorbachev thinking of non-provocative defense,
first unmistakably promulgated by the Warsaw Pact by the Polit-
ical Consultative Committee in May 1987 22 , the nature of victory
in a war with NATO is unclear. While it can be confidently
assumed that the new concepts—militarily ambiguous at any level,
even when explained by the Soviet Minister of Defense Yazov to
the U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci in March 1988—will
only very slowly, perhaps never, be translated into distinctively
defensive operations and new weapons by the General Staff, they
nevertheless result from a revolutionary shift in Soviet polit-
ical thought which directly impacts upon Soviet military doctrine
and specifically, upon ideas of war termination
In the now 70 year reign of Leninist political thinking, the
idea of permanent struggle—and therefore war—was central. In
fact, Lenin foresaw the need for "defensive wars" conducted by
an already victorious socialism, specifically "the defense of a
victorious proletariat against the bourgeoisie of other count-
ries." 23 And he defined as just and lawful wars those fought for
socialism, "for the liberation of other peoples from the bourge-
22 See "On the Military Doctrine of the Members of the
Warsaw Pact," Krasnava zvezda
. May 30, 1987, p. 1.
" J V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobrame sochinenn
,
(Moscow:
Gosizdat, 1963) vol. 30, p. 133.
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oisie." 24 This was the central core of Soviet military thought
and, to a significant degree, the inspiration for the West's
estimate of the Soviet threat.
New Thinking
The dimensions of the changes that have occurred can only
begin to be understood because they challenge some of the
structures of Russian political culture—authoritarianism,
centralization, and secrecy, for example. One stunning example
of the change in political doctrine was General Secretary and
President Gorbachev's address to the United Nations, in December
1988. Not only did he not mention Lenin—and in Soviet political
culture what is not said can be more important than what is said)
but also he all but consigned the idea of permanent class war to
the scrap heap of history. The new era of national relations
"requires de-ideologizing relations among states," he said and,
speaking as the head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
the cradle of socialism, he must have shocked the Marxist world
when he said that "We are, of course, far from claiming to be in
possession of the ultimate truth." 25 In terms of Soviet
political culture, that meant an acknowledgement of the weakening
of the power of the state. 26
24 Ibid.
25 M. S. Gorbachev, Speech to the United Nations General
Assembly, December 7, 1988, quoted in the New York Times .
December 8, 1988, p. A6
.
26 See Keenan, op. cit.
17
That was political "new thinking". By 1985 when Gorbachev
became the General Secretary, the Soviet military establishment
was facing a crisis similar to that of 1955 when rockets and
missiles were incorporated into military art. Soviet thinkers
take their military science seriously and the fact that they
could not solve the problem of how to use nuclear weapons, either
politically or militarily, in a modern war with the West, led to
some serious conclusions which will be examined. The end result
was that they experienced the reality of what Engels and Frunze
had always argued that modern war depends upon the industrial
base and theirs had fallen behind. 27 The arms race for the
Soviet military, whose time orientation is to the future, was
with the West's enormous technological capability and it was a
race which a command economy, even supported by brilliantly
successful industrial and military espionage, could not be sure
of winning.
The failure to win even a little war in primitive Afghani-
stan may have caused the paradigmatic shift that ushered the
Soviet leadership into a new reality. And in a multi-context
centralized culture, major change in one category leads to major
change in all categories. The new thinking would ultimately
affect the Soviet doctrine on war and therefore of war termina-
tion.
27 M. V. Frunze, Izbrannve proizvedenia . Vol. II, (Mos-
cow:Voenizdat, 1957) p. 6.
18
The ideas of perestroyka come not only from political forces
but also from military-technical ones: that nuclear war especial-
ly but any war generally can no longer be a political instrument;
that the devastation of modern, including conventional, war can
be so great that it is obvious security can only be mutual ; that
defense is the only rational military doctrine; that defense
requires a "reasonable" sufficiency of weapons which can be
asymmetrical and should not be provocative; that "deterrence",
when it means stockpiling weapons, has become as dangerous as
war. 28 While considerable debate remains as to the specific
meaning of these terms and the support that exists for them,
there can be little doubt that the old military doctrine based
upon the old world view will not survive.
Possible Soviet-U.S. Wars
The general line emerging in the Soviet Union, from Brezhn-
ev's Tula speech of 1977 increasingly into the present is that
nuclear war cannot be a rational instrument of policy. 29 Not
only was the idea of nuclear war denounced by members of the
party and government but also by the military. For example, the
C-in-C of the Soviet Air Force, Marshal Kutakhov, repeated the
same theme as early as 1983, saying that "....any aggressors'
28 These ideas, later elaborated and interpreted by defense
and government spokesmen, were quite clearly stated in Chapter
IV, "Basic Goals and the Direction of the Party's Foreign Policy
Strategy." See M. S. Gorbachev, "Politicheskiy doklad Tsen-
tral'nogo komiteta KPSS XXVII s'ezdu Kommunisticheskoy partii
Sovetskogo soyuza, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), pp. 80-90.
29 L. I. Brezhnev, "Recti"', Pravda . Jan. 19, 1977, p. 2.
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plan to unleash nuclear war and in doing so to gain victory are
senseless. 30 "
The political denunciation of nuclear war was accompanied by
i
a military realization that there was probably no successful
strategy for winning such a war in Europe. The last solution to
the problem, the idea of the OMG [operational maneuver group]—
a
rapid response, behind-the-lines attack group meant to take out
nuclear capabilities—was probably judged, in the end, a fantasy
solution for a sophisticated age. In any case, it could not
survive in a doctrine of non-provocative defense and could be
expected to retire.
After the Chernobyl disaster, the language became increas-
ingly that, as used by Gorbachev, "of preventing the world from
sliding towards nuclear catastrophe." 31 The implication was that
war, not being a rational instrument, would more than likely
occur by accident.
However, one of the problems for the Soviets was that they
did not estimate the American military thought as "scientific"
and therefore predictable. The line was that it is "short-
sighted, egoistic and adventuristic.
"
32 The problem Gorbachev
30 P. Kutakhov, "Current U.S. Threat to Peace," Patrivnava
zhizn' . May 19, 1983. Trans. JPRS 84119, no. 1789, 12 August
1983, pp. 17-24.
31 M. S. Gorbachev, "Speech at the 11th Congress of the







seemed to think the Soviet Union faced was the possibility a
nuclear war by accident resulting from the machinations of
American militarists. Furthermore, the old distinction between
nuclear and conventional weapons was seen as disappearing as the
latter approximated the former in their destructiveness. 33 While
there can be little doubt that Soviet arguments served to advance
the "peace offensive" in Europe, there was still the heavy weight
of paranoia. "It is no secret that scenarios for a nuclear
strike against us do exist," Gorbachev complained. 34
There are signs that the idea of ending a war begun by
accident is causing a change in Soviet doctrine. Although the
establishment of the "Hot Line" in 1964 was a step in the
direction of preventing war by miscalculation, its fundamental
role was semiotic, to insure that the signals were properly
translated. But for accidental war, there had to be a new Soviet
doctrine.
In Marxist thought, there are no accidents. All, in Soviet
terminology, is scientifically determined. Such a world view
made it extremely awkward for Soviet military scientists to deal
with the problem of an accidental war. What scientific and
rational operations could be formulated for what would be a
political catastrophe? The Soviet estimate of the irrationality,
and ahistorical behavior, of the imperialist powers did seem to
33 Ibid. 13.
34 Ibid. p. 85
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provide a stratagem for escaping from the ideology to consider
the danger of an accidental war. Classifying nuclear war as
irrational and without political purpose was a convenient way of
putting it outside of the dialectic, and therefore of the
permanent class struggle. That seems to have led to a reassess-
ment of the concept of class struggle under modern conditions and
to an ideological revision:
....now that even the class conflicts within capitalist
countries largely take place through the achievement of
compromise within a mutually accepted legal framework
rather than in the form of harsh confrontation. 35
The clarity and unanimity of the Soviet doctrine on the
avoidance of nuclear war has been well documented. 36 But Soviet
policy for fighting a nuclear war, should that awful surprise be
launched, is equally unanimous. General Yazov explained it.
Our strategic nuclear forces are maintained in accord-
ance with the principle of sufficiency for defense and
within the limits of the existing military-strategic
parity existing between the USSR and the USA. The
essence of sufficiency is the requirement to prevent an
unpunished nuclear attack under any, even the most
unfortunate, circumstances. 36
That Western analysts distort the Soviet position, as
General Yazov complained, may well be related to the political
cultures of the two sides: the Soviets thinking in terms of
process and the U. S. in its duality, either defense or offense.
35 A. V. Kozyrev, op. cit.
,
p. 17.
36 See Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations," in
Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zraket,
eds., Managing Nuclear Operations
,
(Washington, D. C. : Brookings,
1987) , Chapter 15.
36
. Yazov, p. 35.
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With respect to war termination, however, the point General Yazov
is making, taking the totality of his position, is that the fact
that the Soviet Union would doubt that the world would survive a
nuclear war would not prevent it from launching a "devastating
rebuff."
The Soviet Files
In view of the "new thinking", what has happened to the U.S.
position on victory? Here, there is a problem. As our major aim
in a war with the Soviet Union would not be to gain territory but
to contain aggression and stop the spread of communism, we will
be presented, if the Soviet Union remains on its present course,
with few problems in war termination. With the Soviet Union
adopting "non-provocative defense", "asymmetrical parity" and
other new doctrinal concepts, our main task is semantic, to
understand what is meant in the context of the new thinking but
also in the context of the political culture.
Currently, Soviet strategic thought seems to be processed
through four major files: 1) that marked Leninist/ideological;
2) political/diplomatic; 3) the military/technical; and 4) the
geopolitical/historical/cultural. Although these are enormous
and imprecise categories, we can demonstrate their usefulness in
helping to clarify problems by applying them to the subject of
Soviet/American war termination.
Under the first category, Leninist/ ideological , there is
not, properly speaking, a concept of war termination as conflict
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is the fundamental law of existence. It is the basis of the
elementary process of thought, the dialectic, and the basic
method of analyzing society, through contradictions. Only after
a mystical qualitative leap of the human kind, beyond some now
very vague social and economic evolution, can we hope to have
termination of human conflict. While it is becoming clear that
the ideological dictatorship of Lenin is coming to an end in the
Soviet Union, it is important to remember that for seventy years,
every Soviet school boy has been trained to think in terms of the
dialectic and to interpret foreign behavior through its lens.
Therefore, there will be these shadow boxes into which Soviet
analysts will undoubtedly file their observations for many years
to come
.
In terms of the second, political, category, war termination
is a systemic concept since it signifies the victory of social-
ism. Alternative endings could not be publicly discussed, until
glasnost
'
in any case. The idea of war termination in this
category is quite simply the complete elimination of the opposi-
tion as a class through political and coercive means.
The third category, the military/technical, is thought of as
a scientific one which fulfills a role frequently misunderstood
in the West. The mistake is due to the mixture of contexts. The
military in the Soviet Union is culturally, ideologically and
socially a functional organization. That is, it serves politics
with "scientific" solutions to the problems posed for it. It
does not create grand strategy. Because the military writes
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about how "to fight and win a nuclear war" does not mean that it
is proposing one.
The assessment of Soviet military culture is fraught with
mirror-imaging in part because we know so little about how it
really works which facilitates the mind filling the gaps with
"reasonable" assumptions. The mirror-imaging is inevitable since
the organization of Soviet military thought, which is "scien-
tific", multi-context, and ideological, does not fit the struc-
ture of American military thought, which tends to be technologi-
cal and minimal context. The Soviets, who culturally assume that
"superiority" and power are achieved in order to be used, see SDI
as a dangerous American scheme; the U.S., mistaking the sincerity
of Soviet statements about our intentions, assumes Soviet
deception and propaganda. 37
The Maritime Strategy provides another example of the
confusion this causes in the strategic culture. Because the
Soviets project that the American military operates under the
same controls as it does, they assume, almost certainly, that The
Maritime Strategy was put forward by the American "ruling class"
for, among other things, propaganda and disinformation. The
military does not, it would argue, telegraph strategic plans in
advance. Nor, in the Soviet view, would a military doctrine be
promulgated for a major war which did not reflect a combined arms
concept.
A good example of misinterpretation and exaggeration is
provided by N. V. Ogarkov in his History Teaches Vigilance , op.
cit. pp. 88-89.
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Because it was nearly impossible to make sense of The
Strategy in a Soviet context, perhaps, there was little Soviet
reaction to its publication, other than the predictable one of
i
describing it as an expression of Reagan's policy of seeking
superiority and confrontation. 38
Thus a Soviet discussion of "war termination" from a
military point of view is necessarily inhibited by the fact that
the subject is controlled by politics.
Finally, from the geopolitical/historical/cultural context
we take only one example. Soviet planning has, until recent
times, been based upon a cultural history of insufficiency, of
having to figure out how to win from an inferior position with
inferior technology and inadequately educated personnel. Because
of this, it has searched for methods for achieving victory
through emphasis on psychological manipulation and control. The
fear of Soviet shortages and the assumption of technological
inferiority to the West has become part of the cultural con-
sciousness and that undoubtedly affects estimates of the ability
to fight wars and to prevail.
On the other hand, the U.S. faces the planning of military
problems from the opposite position of not just having a suf-
ficiency, but even expecting an excess of materiel. World War II
was an excellent example of this when the United States and its
38 David Alan Rosenberg gives a very well-reasoned analysis,
showing an unusual understanding of the Soviet context, in an
article entitled, "It Is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything
Worse: Soviet Reactions to the Maritime Strategy", Naval War
College Review , Summer, 1988
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allies, to Stalin's enormous dissatisfaction, could wait to
launch the Normandy invasion when completely ready for attack.
The Soviets did not experience the luxury of choosing their own
timing for attack until after the Battle of Stalingrad, January
31, 1943.
The U.S. tends to plan its strategy on the basis of tech-
nological and logistical superiority, a strategy of inundating
the enemy, as General Eisenhower described it. 39 Frequently, in
our strategic culture, anxiety is experienced when less is
available. 40
Undoubtedly, these aspects of our strategic cultures have
played an important role in bringing the Soviets to the position
of adopting a new doctrine of defense, a kind of ideological
termination of war as the engine of change. As the Soviet
strategic culture emphasizes the economic base for war and as the
Soviets have acknowledged the inadequacy not only of their
economy but also of their system to support the high-tech
requirements of modern industry (including, presumably, defense
industry) , their own internal reality contradicts their strategic
39 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Crusade in Europe .
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), p. 4, described American strate-
gic culture as one in which an enemy would be overwhelmed by our
capabilities.
40 We only need to make reference to the periods of our
various "bomber", "missile", and "vulnerability" gaps to il-
lustrate this point. See Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sound the
Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat", International Security ,
Fall 1979, Vol. 4, No. 2.
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doctrine. 41 And as the U.S., following its own strategic
culture, intends to maintain its superiority in numbers and
technology, threatening to do so, with SDI, even in the face of
economic hardship, the Soviets could not foresee, in the present
competition, a time when there would be a favorable correlation
of forces. Their process orientation clearly has led to a
radical, paradigmatic, shift; the U.S., following its strategic




A translation aid is needed not for moving from one word or
idea to the other, but for deciphering contexts. This paper
proposes to examine the usefulness of applying some of the
concepts from strategic culture to Soviet/American approaches to
the problems of war termination. In some sense, this represents
a methodological experiment as there are few models to follow for
such an effort. That it is essential to explore such an import-
ant subject cross-culturally is obvious. War termination, like
41 S. A. Bartenev, Economicheskoye protivoborstvo v voyne ,
(Moscow: Voenizdat', 1986) appears to be emphasizing the factors
which "compensate for" and "equalize" imperialist economic
superiority in war. He specifically refers to the Viet Nam war
as one which shows those psychological factors which bring
victory over superior forces. P. 54.
28
deterrence, depends upon perception and thus it occurs in the
mind before it occurs on the battlefield.
But as there is a national style to fighting wars, so must
there be a national style for terminating them. In his pioneer-
ing work, Strategic Surrender , Paul Kecskemeti illustrated the
different national approaches to ending World War II. His study,
without identifying strategic culture as such, provided the data
for deriving some of its elements in war termination.
That a study of political, and then strategic, culture is
absolutely essential as a preliminary for discussing war termina-
tion can hardly be doubted. There is a dichotomy between the
literature on war termination, which generally argues in terms of
rational decisions based upon numerical assessments, and the
experience of how decisions are made in extremis . With respect
to nuclear war, for instance, J. Kahan asserts that:
Psychologists, systems analysts, and political analysts
generally agree that despite all the training in
decision analysis, principled problem solving, or any
other systematic technique, a primary driving force in
decisionmaking will be largely intuitive. When high-
level decisionmakers react to scientifically drawn
analyses of potentially crucial situations, they almost
universally reach back to personal experience, histor-
ical situations, or institutional knowledge when
evaluating the analysis. 42
President Harry Truman seems to have fulfilled that pattern.
On the basis of notes "shaped" into a book had the preconception
that the Japanese were "fanatical" and that to bring the war to
42 J. Kahan, et al., Preventing Nuclear Conflict: What Can
The Behavioral Sciences Contribute?
.





an end, he would have to order the atomic bomb dropped on
populated centers. He decided against a demonstration drop,




There are many examples of cross-cultural asymmetries in
Russian military history. In 1812, after a demonstration of
supremacy, Napoleon thought that his victory in the battle of
Borodino and subsequent occupation of Moscow meant that Russia
would concede total victory. Instead, that battle showed, on a
military level, that even victory in a theater of war could mean
a strategic defeat and on a political level, that Moscow is not
Russia, even if, perhaps, Paris is France.
(There is a modern parallel. Napoleon's exhausted troops
were surrounded in the center of the enemy's greatest physical
and ideological strength with his supply lines stretched to their
terminal weakness. The authors of The Maritime Strategy propose
a somewhat similar campaign at sea.)
Hitler apparently did not learn from that defeat, for he
managed in some respects to repeat it in 1941 with similar
results. Underestimating the enormous Russian capacity for
suffering, preterpelost
'
as Evgenii Evtushenko explained the
cultural characteristic44
,
and different value attached to human
43 Harry S. Truman, "Why I Dropped the Bomb," from a book
edited by Margaret Truman and Scott Meredith to be published by
Warner Books. This excerpt appeared in Parade Magazine , December
4, 1988, p. 17.




qazeta . May, 1988, p. 13.
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life, he mistook the initial success of the drive toward Moscow
for a premature victory and divided his forces.
One unifying element which can be extracted from these very
complex events was that of cultural preconceptions playing a
major part in military decisions. Both Hitler and Napoleon
assumed that capturing Moscow would defeat Russia. The U.S.
assumed that the atomic bomb would force Japanese capitulation in
1945. Paul Kecskemeti argued that for the Japanese the bomb did
not play an absolutely decisive role. 45 The Japanese were
concerned with their cultural survival as much as with their
physical survival and apparently some leaders might have chosen
annihilation if the emperor were not spared.
The Soviet explanation of the reason for the Japanese
surrender is bizarre, but it shows the power of ethnocentric
analysis as well as a problem in cross-cultural semiotics.
Reflecting the influence of their military science upon reality,
the Soviets argue that it was not the atomic bomb which caused
the capitulation but the surprise of the Soviet attack, its
overwhelming force and the resulting disorientation of the
leadership. 46 Semiotically, the Soviets did not respond to
Emperor Hirohito's vague signals nor did they accept that the
Japanese had surrendered until there was absolutely no resis-
45 Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender—The Politics of
Victory and Defeat . (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.)
46 A. M. Vasilevskiy, Delo vsey zhizni , (Moscow: Voenizdat,
1984) p. 472.
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tance. (Following Soviet military thought, the war was pursued
until the enemy's ability to make war was destroyed.) 47
The idea of "escalation dominance" is an example of the
i
problem of understanding cultural [semiotic] signs. In the
American usage, the term implied a set of signals that would be
mutually understood with or without explanation. That implied a
clarity and reliability of intentions which the Soviets consist-
ently doubted, such as the idea of limited nuclear war. The
usefulness of the idea depended, almost entirely, upon the
context of American strategic planning which was projected onto
the Soviets. But the Soviet context was, and remains, entirely
different. Where Americans tend to see the war as unfolding in
specific phases—and therefore try to fit Soviet strategy into
that structure—the Soviets experience a process, the whole war,
once set in motion, moving towards its inevitable and scientif-
ically predetermined, conclusion. The conceptual conflict is
between the dualistic, action-response interpretation and the
organic multi-context one. The one has difficulty understanding
the other. As Genrikh Trofimenko charged, our military spokes-
men "fail to explain what these Pentagon scenarios have in common
with actual Soviet strategy." 48
The Soviet Context of War Termination:
The Military Concept of Victory
47 Ibid., pp. 474-475.
48 Genrikh Trofimenko, The U.S. Military Doctrine, (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1986), p. 143.
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For all Soviet military writers, the course and outcome of
war are judged by the political goals. 49 The roots of this idea
are, of course, Marxist and confirmed by Lenin quoting Clausewitz
who sees war as a form of political action. And politics, of
course, is the province of the Politburo, not the military.
Thus, in the modern political culture of the Soviet state,
victory is taken out of the hands of the military since it must
be defined by the politicians.
While military writers can speak of victory in past wars,
they seldom use the term pobeda when speaking of present and
future wars. (Even the concept of "partial victory" [ chastnaya
pobeda ] mentioned by Gareyev was not further defined, although he
referred to it as a principle. 50 ) Instead, they often refer to
"the outcome of armed combat" or the achievement of strategic
goals (which may be theater goals.) To understand this, we must
refer, briefly, to the structure of Soviet military thought.
As Marx uncovered the scientific laws which govern the study
of man, all categories of knowledge, including the military, must
be pursued in the Soviet Union as if on a scientific base. The
research that must be conducted, the inquiries to be answered,
49 Soviet Minister of Defense, D. T. Yazov, ritually
repeated this position, in spite of qlasnost
'
and "new thinking"
in his book, Na strazhe sotsialisma i mira , (Moscow rVoenizdat,
1987)
,
p. 11, saying, "The Party leads the development and
implementation of military doctrine, determines the main direc-
tions of military organizational development and the development
of the armed forces."
50 M. A. Gareyev, M. V. Frunze-Voennyy teoretik . (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1985) p. 239.
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therefore have to do with uncovering the laws and principles
which are known to exist but which have not been revealed.
The effect of this approach is to isolate military theory
from other categories, to make it become a "thing in itself."
Thus, military theory tends to deal with "raw" power, as Trofi-
menko calls it 51 , totally subordinate to, but somewhat isolated
from, the political culture. It is rather like the relationship
between highway engineering and environmental law.
The strategic, like the political culture, has both a
vertical and a horizontal dimension. In its vertical dimension,
it is extremely compartmented hierarchically. "Those who need to
know, know" and if you do not, you should not ask. 52 In its
horizontal dimension, it has to be reconnected with the ideology,
and that appears to be the job of the Main Political Administra-
tion of the Armed Forces, and the Politburo and its organs, such
as the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Thus, the
military analysis of war termination is a technical/scientific
one, but in the political subordination.
The Science of War Termination
We can get some sense of the power of the ideology to
control military, even scientific, ideas from a mathematical
study by K. V. Tarakanov, one of the founders of Soviet decision-
making theory. His book, devoted to the consideration of
51 Trofimenko, op. cit.
,
p. 6.
52 Edward Keenan, "Muscovite Political Folkways," Russian
Review , vol. 45, no. 2, 1986, pp. 115-118.
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mathematical methods for research in armed combat, makes some
precise definitions. 53 He identifies as the first "law-governed
pattern of armed combat" as that the course and outcome depend
upon the political goals of war. He then makes a leap of faith
which is extremely significant, for he writes:
The dependence of the course and outcome of armed
combat on the war's political goals especially charac-
teristically appears in the strategic scale: even in
conditions of extremely unfavorable quantitative
correlation of forces, with stable equal conditions,
victory goes to the side which is conducting a just
war. 54
In Soviet military science, there is room for ambiguity. It
occurs between the concept of military science or laws and
military art. Both support the thesis from Marx and Lenin, that
there are in war objective relationships "independent of the
knowledge and will of man" 55 . Military art finds theoretical
ways to interpret these relationships and through those inter-
pretations, law-governed patterns are discovered.
It is difficult then, within the scientific study of armed
combat for Soviets to deal with war termination since the basic
outcome of war, understood to be a contest between social classes
and systems, cannot be doubted.
53 K. V. Tarakanov, Matematika i vooruzhennaya bor'ba
.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974.) Translated by SCITRAN F33657-78-D-
0619, FTD. p. 23.
54 Ibid. This author has edited some obvious mistakes in the
text.
55 Ibid. p. 10.
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Defeat, as previously mentioned, is almost never discussed
in Soviet military writing. Although, with qlasnost
'
political
shortcomings are admitted, there have not yet been similar
confessions from the military sector. Apparently that will come
after Stalin is attacked as a wartime leader.
The context of Soviet thought—organic and process oriented-
-is not conducive to the contemplation of defeat. Attention is
on the whole battle, the outcome of the theater operations, and
not the parts. Second, as war is a manifestation of historic
political processes, defeat is not scientifically possible. And
finally, on the semiotic level, discussion of defeat would signal
the possibility of the fallibility of the system and its leaders,
something the political and ideological cultures do not accept. 56
Thus, the Soviet military discussion of victory is about
decisiveness in armed combat which must be offensive for an army
fulfilling a political doctrine which is defensive. (It is very
likely that the new defensive strategy will evolve out of a
redefinition of these terms.) Clearly, if the study of war is
indeed scientific, then termination cannot be scientifically
studied without great theoretical difficulty.
56 It is very likely that, until the present, any effort to
wargame scenarios which resulted in anything but victory would,
even under conditions of qlasnost
'
. result in even more severe
party criticism than Senator Russell tried to impose forbidding
the Department of Defense to spend a dime "in any way which even
contemplates the surrender of this country to those who would
destroy us." Quoted by James E. King, Jr., in his review of
Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender
,
(Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1958), in World Politics . Vol. XI, April 1959,
no. 3, p. 418.
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In the traditional view, "a decisive victory over the enemy
[is achieved with] offensive operations, " according to Tarakanov.
"They have the greatest effect when there is a superiority of
forces and equipment," is a self-evident universal law or
principle, it would seem, which the Soviets do not tire of
repeating. There is even an equation for decisiveness, or
victory, in armed combat:
R=fr (r 1 ,r2 ,r 3 ,r4,r 5 )
where R is the decisiveness of armed combat and r^....^ relate
to the tasks, scale, quantity, pace, and offensiveness of the
operation. 57
The concept is not obviously sophisticated. In fact, it
seems to be based on the Soviet experience of World War II, but
only, of course, after the Battle of Stalingrad. In this
connection, it is useful to observe that when Soviet military
spokesmen denounce the United States' search for superiority,
they are repeating the political more than the military line.
The military position is, of course, that given a correlation of
forces, a plan is then formulated for winning in combat which
produces effective superiority.
Science vs. Politics
57 Ibid. p. 24.
37
In considering the Soviet scientific approach to war, the
rhetoric, so dry, repetitive and self-confident, can itself be
deceptive, for its scientific base seems to be built on political
i
sand. The initial position for the equation, the values during
the course of the operation and the period of termination, are
all determined by politics. There may certainly be laws, but
there are also theorems and it would perhaps be less misleading
to call the law-governed patterns simply theories of war.
A second problem Soviet military theorists have in dealing
with war is that both the political doctrine and the ideology
require Soviet forces to be theoretically defensive. The
formula, endlessly repeated with minor variations, can hardly be
ignored:
. [there] have arisen new kinds of wars, wars for
the defense of the socialist Motherland. Their causes
do not come from the nature and politics of socialist
governments, but from the politics of imperialism, from
its efforts to hold back the due process of socialist
development of society. A war in the defense of
socialism is not motivated by the desire to seize
others' territory or for the enslavement of the peoples
of other countries, but for the defense of freedom and
independence of the government of the workers and
peasants. For that reason, such a war is, to the very
highest degree, just and bears, inevitably, a revolu-
tionary character. 58
We shall find, in discussing war termination in Soviet
society, that there will be this constant, and often contradic-
tory, interplay between culture and theory. For example, in the
former, there is no hesitation to use guile, deception and if
58 N. V. Ogarkov, Vseqda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechest-




necessary capitulation to reduce the risks from an enemy; in the
latter, since reality is determined by an unending interplay of
contradictions, there is no scientific concept for an absolute
termination.
The problem of considering war termination is further
complicated by the Soviet ideological categories of war. In this
case, war is the engine of change and its victory is an economic
as well as a military confirmation of a superior system. The
object of all wars is to advance the cause of socialism. Those
are the just wars. The unjust wars are fought to delay the
advancement of socialism. Even wars between contending {non-
socialist} classes are to be judged and fought for their con-
tribution to social advancement.
However, in the seventy-year history of the Soviet Union,
while aid and scientific, military advice have been often given
to advance the cause of socialism, wars have been fought primari-
ly for reasons of security. Even the 1919-1920 war against
Poland, initiated under the belief that the Polish working class
would join the Soviet internationalist movement, was fought to
preserve strategic territory the Soviets considered theirs.
The ideological resolution of the problem was a kind of
socialist megalomania in which it was argued that just wars were
those which increased the power of the socialist heartland,
the arsenal of the working class, to perform its internationalist
duty. Victory, then, could not be separated from ideology and as
World War II showed, "nationalism", even after the Bolsheviks had
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nearly erased it, was what could drive the Russians to supreme
self-sacrifice, not a foreign ideology.
Sufficiency and Science
The problem with any science, as with all knowledge, is that
it creates the categories into which information will be sorted,
thus possibly prejudicing the solution. Thus, when the 27th
Party Congress, and the Warsaw Pact, adopted the doctrine of
"sufficiency", they gave the West a problem of interpretation
which would have to rely upon political culture more than
military science, for "sufficiency" is a culturally relative
term.
As General Yazov explained:
The military might of the Soviet armed forces is based
upon a level corresponding to the threat of aggression
and with observance of the principle of sufficiency for
defense. This means that the Soviet Union, like other
socialist countries, does nothing in the area of
developing and producing armaments beyond that which is
essential for defense and which has just as much power
and means as is essential for defense from attack from
abroad. 59
To understand this new doctrine, it is necessary to estimate
not only the Soviet Union's evaluation of the correlation of
forces60
,
but also its estimate of the threat, its psychology
—
59 D. E. Yazov, p. 34.
60 The influence of Soviet military science on the study of
war is apparent. Not only is it common in the West to talk about
"the correlation of forces" but also it is becoming more frequent
to see considerations of morale, production, efficiency of
command, etc. to be taken into account in figuring the equation.
Furthermore, the European concept of "operations" as a category
between tactics and strategy seems finally to have found a place
in American thought via, it can be presumed, Soviet military
science. There is a good reason for this. As the problems of
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what it deems necessary for security, what irrational suspicions
and visions it creates—and its strategic culture.
Although the doctrine is presented as new, it is, in fact, a
restatement of a decision that seems to have been made at the
11th Party Congress in 192 2 and flows from the problem of whether
or not there should be a sufficiency for defense or, presumably,
an excess for exporting revolution, or at least defending it
abroad. The debate, in which Trotsky argued for the internation-
al revolution and Stalin for making the Soviet Union the arsenal
of socialism, was part of the inevitable cycle of looking outward
and then looking inward. And the pattern can be expected to
continue since the legitimacy of the Marxist government is
dependent upon the internal perception of some economic success
and an external movement toward an internationalization of the
proletariat.
Russia, has often faced the world from the "victim" pos-
ition: it has had to be reactive to superior enemies with
inferior resources. That has encouraged the Soviets to make
maximum use of psychological maneuver just at the edge of the
battlefield in order to equalize the odds and to survive.
The marshals of the Soviet Union, defense analysts and
scholars, historians and politicians all begin their studies, on
whatever aspect of war, with a kind of ritual whine about the
evils of the surrounding world and the unfairness of reality and
war and peace focus more narrowly on the superpowers, they have
to learn to speak, and interpret, each others 1 language.
Inevitably, learning the words creates new concepts.
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of history. This is what we are calling the "victim" position
—
the idea that to survive, one must suffer—which comes through
very clearly as the Soviet view of itself. This could be called
"the Port Arthur" syndrome, the persistence of the humiliation
Russia experienced at the hands of the Japanese in 1905. 61
(Stalin, in his World War II victory proclamation, had declared
that "For forty years we, the men of the older generation, have
waited for this day.")
It is obvious that in war termination, operating from this
position, the Soviet Union would make decisions on information
interpreted differently from the West. These would be influenced
not only by the historical dimensions (which a culture grounded
in the present does not sufficiently appreciate) but also by the
emotionally indoctrinated vision of the United States as an
aggressor who offends moral and historical world order. Here is
Marshal Ustinov's ritual warning:
Aggressive circles in the USA and NATO, are aiming, in
whatever way they can, to destroy the military strate-
gic balance which has developed and to achieve military
superiority over the USSR and Warsaw Pact Countries.
They are trying to reduce the socialist countries to a




The dynamics of the process has little to do with reason.
Rather it is symbiotic. Since the Revolution, the West has been
pictured as unremittingly aggressive and offensive. As Stalin
61 See William H. Luers, "Don't Humiliate Gorbachev," on
the Op Ed page, N.Y. Times . Jan 30, 1989.
62 D. F. Ustinov, Serving the Country and the Communist
Cause , trans. Penny Dole, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983,) p. 4.
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clearly showed, the identification of enemies can be used to
promote, expand and sustain political power. He reduced Russian
political culture to a formula:
The history of old Russia consisted, among other things
of being beaten for its backwardness.... If you fall
behind and are weak, it means you are not right and you
will be beaten and enslaved. If you are strong, it
means you are right and that people must beware. 63
Some Cultural Asymmetries
The impossibility of discussing war termination between the
superpowers from the point of view of only one of them is
obvious. The result must inevitably be an exercise in which
mirror-imaging plays a dangerous role as the temptation to fit
Soviet phenomena into Western categories is automatic. This we
experience annually in trying to present the strategic balance
and the Soviets face in trying to determine the correlation of
forces.
For example, our operational planning tends to be weapons
oriented with lesser attention paid to the flanks and our allies.
The Soviet demand for parity, which includes political equality
as well, is essential to them from their victim position.
However, it confronts the American political culture where there
is a need to be the "best" and to have the "most". For us,
security involves superior numbers. 64 In neither culture is the
63 J. V. Stalin, Sochineniva , (Moscow: Goslitizdat, 1951)
,
Vol. 13, pp. 38-39.
64 The history of "the numbers game" is very long indeed
43
idea of a balance of power comfortable. As both tend to be
messianic, they do not recognize a natural equilibrium for other
ideologies.
i
Asymmetries, certainly debatable, in which the two realities
differ are suggested below:
U.S. Soviet














13 Current estimates dominate
14 Plans series of limited wars




3. War as controlled chaos
4. Maximizes sacrifice
5. Geopolitics dominates




10 Victory changes society
11 Targets geopolitically
12 Violence maximized
13 Focuses on the future
14 Doubts limited war
but perhaps no more dramatic than in the Kennedy election of 1960
when the assertion that the Russians were ahead in missiles,
although mistaken, apparently contributed to the Republican
defeat. Margaret Mead comments on this American need for
superiority in And Keep Your Powder Dry , (N.Y.: W. Morrow and




Let us see how these asymmetries might affect problems of
war termination:
1) As the Soviets function on the basis of command at the
top, once a war has been set in motion, it will be difficult, if
not impossible to stop. In case of decapitation, commanders are
likely to continue automatically fulfilling their orders.
"Initiative" in the Soviet armed forces means fulfilling missions
no matter what the obstacles. Because in the U.S. authority is
dispersed and alternating, in the event of the disruption of
command communications, cultural conditioning encourages on-scene
decisions and initiative. Although the U.S. command strictly
controls nuclear release, individual judgment, influenced by
cultural preconceptions, inevitably would play a powerful role
for which there would not be a Soviet counterpart.
2) America's strategy of deterrence has promoted a weapons'
policy of superiority through ever improved arms culminating in
the enormous industrial and technological demands of SDI. Again
the Soviets are being challenged to respond, as the Russians
always have, from a position of industrial and technological
inferiority. But this time, there was no alternative to quality
and the traditional method of trial and error production with
selective rejection according to priority demands did not keep up
with the pace of technological change. That, in combination with
the internal brain-drain forced a turn to a market economy.
45
The Soviets have benefitted from our technological preoc-
cupation. We have often assessed their equipment through our
mirrors with consequences in our estimate of the threat. As our
minimal-context culture relys heavily on numbers, and as Soviets
acting from the inferior position tend to retain even outmoded
military equipment, our cultural patterns tended to support the
preconceptions. 65 (See #6 below.)
Coming from the theoretical position, in war termination,
the Soviets will believe, unless there are extreme measures of
assurance, that U.S. proposals are disguises, like SDI, for
surprise attack. They will be reasoning from looking in their
mirror image that we are theory driven as well. Properly
understood, this can be used politically, but improperly applied,
it can unleash Soviet paranoia.
3) The disconnect between the Soviet and U.S. views of war
in general is striking. U.S. planning in its logical and
rational assumptions appears to insulate itself from the human
element, preferring to deal with abstract modelling. 66 In
contrast, the Soviets begin with psychological questions about
the cohesiveness of the rear and strategies for disorganizing the
65 It has been an occasional American experience to declare
a new Soviet weapon the finest of its kind in the world, only to
discover that it was crude, if effective. The Krivak destroyer
was declared to be the most powerful ship of its size afloat; the
Secretary of the Air Force described the MIG 2 5 as "probably the
best interceptor in the world today." See Robert C. Seamans,
Science . Vol. 212, 1973, p. 1012.
66 Colin Gray discusses the "rational" style of American
strategic culture in "National Style in Strategy," International
Security
. Vol. 6, No. 2, 1981, especially pp. 44-47.
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enemy. Undoubtedly, consideration of the sheer magnitude of
logistics problems (food, spare parts, repair facilities,
distribution systems, clothes and heating equipment, etc.) act as
an inhibiting factor in Soviet military initiative whereas in
American plans, these items are assumed, for the most part, to be
available, if not always organized. Everyday chaotic Soviet life
reminds them that war, too, is chaos and their constant battle
with ordinary supplies and hunger reminds them that war brings
even more extreme suffering. For war termination this means that
once war has begun, the Soviets will be making judgments from a
different perspective than the Americans.
4) As an expression of the above idea, American calculations
on the effects of casualties do not correspond with Soviet
attitudes. We learned something about the effect of these
cultural differences during the war in Viet Nam when the North
Vietnamese continued to operate under conditions which we
estimated to be unacceptable. America's culture is to protect
human life and to be very cautious about committing itself to
operations with large losses. The Soviet culture, at least in
World War II, was to sustain large losses even for small gains.
War is only won with extreme sacrifice and the risk and expendi-
ture of equipment. A traditional element of Russian masculinity
is to be able to die for the fatherland even for no reason
without protest and without showing fear. 67 In other words, the
67 Soviet and Imperial Russian memoir literature frequently
refers to the waste of human life by senior commands, of attacks
ordered without preparation or ammunition, etc. For example,
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Soviets can be expected to sustain far greater losses than the
Americans before they consider moves toward war termination
clearly indicated. 68
5) It is odd that U.S. strategic culture seems to be, in the
20th century, abstracted from considerations of geopolitics. Our
wars in Viet Nam and Korea are striking examples. Furthermore,
we accepted the challenge for big wars there in areas of our
least concern and greatest distance, while avoiding the same
scale for the same kind of challenge in our home waters in Cuba
and now in Nicaragua.
In any case, Soviet strategy is extremely sensitive to
geopolitical considerations. We can see the difference just by
comparing the two navies: the Soviet navy develops its operations
on the basis of specific choke points, primarily in adjacent
waters, and the U.S. navy its strategy on the basis of sea
control
.
In war termination, the Soviets are likely to be more
prepared for agreement once a geopolitically defensible position
has been achieved while the U.S. will probably, mistakenly,
expect that some level of destruction will be the breaking point.
Kirill Uspensky—Kirill Kostsinskii, V teni Bolshoqo Doma .
(Tenafly, N.J.: Hermitage, 1987), p. 34—wrote about how much
blood it cost to improve the military art of the leadership in
World War II and concluded that "We won as we always had through
the use of canon fodder."
68 See Robert Conquest, The Great Terror , (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. 515-535.
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6) A major problem is that the U.S. tends to be so tied to
its perceptions of the present that it will have difficulty
taking into account the Soviet proclivity for experiencing the
future and the past as having a current reality. In other words,
the Soviets expect to be given credit for what they have planned,
whether the plan is achieved or not. 69 This cultural charac-
teristic would complicate all aspects of war termination discus-
sions as the Soviets would be, probably, demanding credit for
achievements which had not occurred such as their claim to have
caused the capitulation of Japan.
7) The problem resulting from the American assumption of
"rationalism," and the Soviet perception of us as anachronistic
and subjective has been mentioned. The most important effect of
this on war termination is that Soviets will not estimate that
Americans are either reliable or sensible and Americans will not
understand that Soviets are not irrational or incapable of trust
but responding to their own values and historical perspectives.
In the extreme, the danger is that the Soviet leadership will
consider it useless to depend upon the reliability of American
positions.
69 Khrushchev was a prime purveyor of this aspect of Russian
cultural reality, but Admiral Gorshkov and other military leaders
display it as well. The former, for example, already in Seapower
of the State claimed that the Soviet navy could locate submarines
anywhere in the world's oceans, a claim that General Secretary
Gorbachev implied at the end of the 1988 summit when he said that
nuclear weapons could be detected on naval ships "whether surface
or submarines...." Reported by Gregory Fossedal, "Have our subs
become vulnerable?", Washington Times , January 22, 1988, p. F-4.
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8) Ever since World War II, the Soviets have emphasized that
the main law and principle of warfare, and more so as weapons
increase in range and destructiveness, is surprise. If we
i
understand properly the preeminence of theory in Soviet strategic
culture, then it is clear that the Soviets have considered
extensively how to initiate war without warning, and lacking that
ability, they are unlikely to initiate war. In American strat-
egic culture, on the other hand, we have assured ourselves that
war could not take place without warning. Obviously, the danger
here is that the Soviets, preparing for surprise, will misinter-
pret the signals.
9) The point about the Soviet's emphasis upon iron control
is that their forces are likely to carry out their missions to
their end under conditions of loss of communications no matter
what the logic of the situation might dictate. Furthermore, they
are unlikely to respond to lateral control or to any commands
other than through the established hierarchy. While Soviet
military theorists are fully aware of the problems of this kind
of organization under conditions of modern warfare, they will
have great difficulty trying to change it.
Because the U.S. emphasizes command and allows initiative to
weaken control, U. S. forces, especially under the same condi-
tions, would, according to their own strategic culture, tend to
perform the individualized "rational" act with commanders going
their separate ways. In war termination, this could easily
destroy any Soviet trust. On the other hand, the U. S. would
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have difficulty understanding the seriousness of the Soviet
assurance, as about limited use of nuclear weapons, for instance,
that once a chain of events has been set in motion, it must
proceed to its inevitable conclusion.
10) That the U.S. does not have a plan or trained personnel
for a post-victorious Eastern Europe will surely introduce
enormous problems and confusion. A Soviet strength is that its
objective is known to everyone, to change the political system
and to eliminate the traditional centers of power and control.
That means that the Soviets would engage in war termination
discussions with alternative leaders and would not, in all
probability, feel constrained to keep agreements with traditional
power centers that were, in any case, to be discarded by history.
11) While it is claimed that U.S. targeting is more subtle
than it was in the early sixties when all communist nations would
have been simultaneously under attack, the logic of American
political culture is that targets will be chosen for technical
and military significance with lesser attention to manipulation
for political goals in war termination: for example, to influence
Ukrainian separatism or Karelian irredentism. This is partly a
function of our minimal-context culture in which we think of the
Soviet Union as one whole and not as a conglomerate of tens of
nationalities. Soviet strategic culture is different from
American with regard to weapons. In the Second World War,
bombing was primarily used as part of combined operations and
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not, as the Western powers used it, to demoralize populations. 70
Although the guerrilla war in Afghanistan might challenge this
argument, objectives were not usually people but military
targets. Soviet commentators pretend not to understand U.S.
counterforce, countervalue arguments, considering them transpar-
ent disguises for plans for a sudden strike. (Soviet interpreta-
tions of American strategic war plans since the days of the
Dulles "Massive Retaliation" have quite consistently assessed
American decisions as a search for the ultimate weapon to use for
a first strike. 71 )
Calculations of victory based upon percentages of dead and
destroyed, such as the Herman Kahn sort of reasoning, are simply
not found in Soviet military writing and would appear to be alien
to Soviet thought. 72 (This does not imply that the Soviets
would not employ massive attacks on the U.S. homeland if that
were judged to be an operational or political necessity as the
January 1989, Moscow meeting about the Cuban Missile Crisis
showed. The threshold principle needs to be applied here. Once
nuclear strikes begin, Soviet responses would be, according to
the strategic culture, massive, and presumably extremely destruc-
70 See, for example, G. K. Zhukov, Reminiscences and
Reflections. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), 2 vols., vol.
2 , p. 273
.
71 See V'yunenko, op. cit.
,
p. 11, for a traditional
statement of this position.
72 Trofimenko, p. 118.
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tive, but part of an operational plans with specific objectives.
Traditionally, Soviet psychological operations on civilian
targets occur in the phase of war before fighting begins. 73 )
12) The above point emphasizes the asymmetry that the
Soviets have consistently rejected the American notion that the
violence of war can somehow be controlled. It is quite probable
that they have advertised this position as a deterrent to
American aggression, to make us understand that escalation
dominance cannot be a practical concept. It is also quite
evident that the Soviets have plans for lesser levels of violence
than all-out nuclear war certainly in the Western TVD and its
flanks. 74 Nevertheless, Soviet strategic culture is heavily
weighted toward the use of mass and maximum violence, especially
when those responses are not expected by the enemy. It is in
this way, by stunning the opposition, making him unable to think
or act, that wars, according to Soviet theory, are won.
13) The weight of the factor of time has been discussed.
It appears again in considering estimates. Because the Soviets
73 Evidence that Soviets targeted cities, rather than
military objectives during the 60' s when they possessed few
ICBM's appears to be coming from the Moscow conference on the
Cuban missile crisis of 1962, op.cit., N. Y. Times . January 29,
1989, p. 1.
74 See the "Voroshilov Lectures" and subsequent papers.
These are a series of papers resulting from interviews and
cooperative writing with former Afghani colonels, Jalali and
Wardak and retired colonel John Sloan, based on lectures given at
the Voroshilov and Frunze Academies in the 70' s. The results of
this work have been published by the Science Applications
International Corporation and the Soviet Army Studies Office,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
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are very oriented toward the future, they, of course, project the
same tendency onto their enemies. Thus American plans for SDI,
however tentative, increase the current threat and confirm, for
the Soviets, the permanence of aggressive intent.
The U.S. tends to project the present situation into a kind
of permanent future while the Soviets are busy trying to impose
the future onto the present. In war termination, the U.S. will
tend to underestimate the rapidity of change while the Soviets
will be making agreements with a private knowledge that they are
invalid, such as the agreement for Polish democratic elections
after the Second World War, SALT I and the advent of MIRVed
missiles, the Helsinki Accords, and so on.
We can apply this idea to the current moves for fundamental
reorganization in the Soviet Union. Although revolutionary
changes are being proposed, they are in basic contradiction to
Russian political folkways. There is little doubt that the
system will be significantly modified, but there is also little
doubt that there will eventually be a conservative revanche in
the cycle of change.
(We have had an example of that in the recent past. There
were any expert predictions during the Khrushchev years that the
Soviet Union could not return to Stalinism, but by 1967, politi-
cal prisoners were again entering the camps. In the quite
legitimate excitement about Soviet changes, it is easy to forget
that those, too, are the consequence of Russian cultural ways and
take place within that context and not our own.)
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14) In conclusion, the most important asymmetry has already
been addressed: the problem of limited wars or limited weapons
use. Given the two, contending political and strategic cultures,
it is very unlikely that in a war there would be any chance that
there would be stable, agreed limits imposed by any condition
other than individual perception of advantage.
III. Applying the Theory:
The Semiotics of Termination
We have seen that the U.S. and NATO concept in a war with
the Soviet Union, to assert control at the lowest level of
violence, is in fundamental conflict with Soviet strategic
culture. It is more difficult, but extremely important, to
demonstrate that it is not congruent with the structure of Soviet
thought about war; i.e., that it cannot be integrated into the
Soviet context of war.
We have already considered the idea that Soviet/Russian
culture, starting from the multi-context position, tends to view
any social engagement as taking place in a complex circle of
interacting events. On the other hand, the U.S., being a minimal
context culture, prefers to study an event insulated to the
extent that is possible, from surrounding events. (An excellent
example of the process is The Maritime Strategy.)
The Soviets, then, in thinking about war, start from the
high ground of interpreting each event as a sign signalling a
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change in the whole. On the international scale, this conflict
of cultures occurs between the Soviet Union and the United States
with respect to SDI. In the last three Summit meetings, Presi-
i
dent Reagan has urged General Secretary Gorbachev to consider SDI
out of the context of Soviet-American parity, but, of course,
without success. 75
This kind of difference in thought, originating in unlike
systems, necessarily operates at all levels of the interaction
between the two cultures. For example, it is implicit in The
Maritime Strategy that the Soviets will understand that the
attacking forces are planning not to use unconventional weapons.
In a "limited" European war, it is assumed that if anti-tank,
tactical nuclear weapons are used that the Soviets will recognize
that cities and other groupings will not be attacked, at that
stage.
Like the idea of non-provocative defense, these are semiotic
concepts. Their validity depends upon a mutually recognized and
consistently interpreted code which the two sides periodically
reconfirm. The Soviet pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons
was an example of an attempt to establish rules for the game but
it was a pledge which NATO could not take up.
We see how these signs, when not consistent with the
context, give false, therefore dangerous, signals. In 1972,
President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed an agree-
75 See summary report, The New York Times International ,
June 2, 1988, p. A6 , for example.
56
ment called "The Basic Principles of U.S. -Soviet Relations." The
understanding was that war could not be used to solve problems.
However, the U.S. understood "war" to include revolutions and
intervention. The Soviet Union did not understand "war" to
include national liberation or battles to protect the gains of
socialism. Subsequent events in Ethiopia, Angola, and Afghanis-
tan set America off on its anger chain which could, in a non-
nuclear age, have led to war.
Another Soviet effort to establish semiotic agreement has
been the ubiquitously affirmed assurance that any use of nuclear
weapons would lead to global war. To make the threat clearer,
Soviet military spokesmen have added, ominously, that the U.S.
could not expect to escape unharmed. In terms of the strategic
culture, these statements should be taken seriously for they fit
the threshold pattern of Soviet thought: avoid war at all costs
but if it begins use maximum force.
The Soviet Defense Minister's, Marshal Akhromeyev ' s , July
1988 visit to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was
almost entirely a recognition of the need for additional semiotic
assurances and resulted in agreements for mutual visits, inspec-
tions, and exchanges.
The Language of Signs
In the rush for joint ventures, even businessmen are
learning about the problems of cultural understanding. They have
learned that for Soviets, "to invest" means to give money for
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their use and that there is only one word to translate all of the
different English words for "profit."
For example, many words which can be unambiguously trans-
lated int the two languages, change their meanings in different
contexts. We have seen that this is true of concepts of victory.
It is also true of "strategy" and "strategic". There is no
specific Soviet naval, air or ground forces strategy since Soviet
use of the word does not pertain to services but to military
problems and their solutions. The Soviet use of the word
"strategic" is a good example of the difference between multi-
context and minimum-context thought. Whereas in our war col-
leges, we have had to make do for many years with the falsely
dichotomous "tactics" and "strategy", the Soviets have had
"tactics", "operations" and "strategy."
Because of the complications of modern war (some tactical
operations can solve strategic problems, for example) , they have
inserted new levels to the hierarchy so that now, there are
"tactics", "tactical operations," "operations," "strategic
operations" and "strategy." In addition, there seems to be an
extension of the notion of "strategy" to include "limited
strategy" which perhaps corresponds with the as yet unclear
notion of General Gareyev's of "partial victory." 76
76 M. A. Gareyev, op. cit. The notion of "partial victory"
undoubtedly has to do not only with the changes in the nature of
war but also with revised Soviet political perceptions. For
example, the incohesiveness of the international working class is
a major blow to Soviet military, as well as ideological, thought.
Furthermore, the failure of the Soviet economy to maintain the
military-industrial lead has grave consequences, from the Marxist
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In this regard, we must take note of our initial distinction
between military technical and scientific analysis and the
political/ideological one. When "strategy" is used technically,
it has to do with quite concrete concepts such as geographical
areas, weapons, sizes of forces, and objectives. When used with
more political connotations, the strategy probably proceeds from
the military/political Defense Council and not the General Staff.
This dependence on context for defining strategy also makes
a difference in how Soviets designate strategic forces. For
instance, the doctrine of "no first use" means that strategic
nuclear forces cannot be called "strategic attack forces". 77
Semiotics and Politics
In a multi-context system, the power of classification to
affect decisions is enormous because thought patterns become so
enmeshed. Thus, although Sweden is staunchly neutral, because of
its bourgeois inclinations, the Soviets obviously expect its
wartime role to be hostile to Soviet interests. Operational
plans are consequently created and tested, most obviously by
Soviet submarines, for that contingency in spite of the degree to
which less stable classifications, such as nuclear free zones,
are affected. 78
point of view, for Soviet successes in war.
N. V. Ogarkov, Istoriya uchit bditel 'nosti . (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1985), p. 77.
78 The admission to the Swedish Moscow correspondent that
the submarines were sent on intelligence missions by the Soviet
Defense Ministry very probably because it did not trust Swedish




As the origin of war is in the social system, so must
its termination be in the social system. As Marshal Ogarkov
wrote:
The fundamental contradiction of the present era is
the contradiction between socialism and imperialism.
One of its sharpest manifestations is the aggressive-
ness of imperialism in its relationship with socialism.
Imperialism depends upon the strength of its weapons to
turn backwards the course of history, to strangle the
government of the workers, to restore its former global
domination. 79
It is obvious that war termination cannot be studied
abstracted from the economic (and political) stage of the
contestants involved. This, of course, is Soviet doctrine which
has been reaffirmed as the correct line since Lenin. 80 This is
one of the major asymmetries between the Soviet and American
approaches to war termination. The Soviets charge the bourgeois
West with not understanding the dependence of doctrine on
politics, of confusing the issue of approaching the study of war
from a stage of subjectivism.
This leads to major problems in prediction: if a doctrine is
based upon scientific laws, wartime behavior is predictable if
the principles of application are understood; if the doctrine is
Nevertheless, the admission was a likely illustration of the role
the concept of class orientation can play in determining Soviet
military missions. The Soviet admission was reported by Arve
Hoff, Aftenposten . June 30, 1988, p. 7.
79 Ogarkov, p. 11.
80 One of the current statements is by the Minister of
Defense, D. E. Yazov, op. cit.
. p. 29. "Doctrine reflects the
politics of a given specific government in the military field of
knowledge and flows from that."
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based upon subjectivism, then wartime behavior is unpredictable,
capricious, and irrational. Under such circumstances, the West
has the advantage in being able to estimate Soviet operations (if
it has done its cross-cultural homework) , but it would be unable
to control their levels of violence since the Soviets would not
adopt the West's "rationality".
Some Possibilities
In case of war with the Soviet Union, what policy does our
analysis of the two strategic cultures suggest?
1. First and most important, we should understand that the
Soviets have assumed for thirty years that nuclear war would
cause their complete destruction and yet they have organized
militarily, industrially and intellectually to fight such a war.
Whether or not this is an example of what Edmund Wilson called
the strange Russian penchant for self-immolation, it should cause
us to take seriously that the Soviets have been prepared for the
execution phase of a nuclear war plan and that once war was
initiated, according to their doctrine, it would be very dif-
ficult to stop.
The Soviet expectation that even limited war would lead to
nuclear global war would probably be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In any case, the statement tells us about Soviet preconceptions.
As the Soviet assurance is consistent with the strategic culture,
any Western proclivity to dismiss the Soviet statement as
propaganda on the grounds that it does not reflect a rational
(mirror) image.
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2. Although the idea may seem somewhat alien to our minimal
context culture, war termination with the Soviets can be prac-
ticed intellectually in advance. The idea comes from chess where
i
the object is to foresee and avoid checkmate the structural
pattern of Soviet thought.
The Soviets must first fight their wars, if they have that
chance, from an ideological position. Therefore, there is the
possibility of fighting the war on a theoretical, gaming (negoti-
ating), level. That is the process which appears to be underway
with arms reduction negotiations and bi-lateral communications on
various levels.
For example, because the Soviets believe that military art
is fundamentally a scientific study and that while war may be
controlled chaos the opening phase can be scientifically descr-
ibed provided a surprise change in the correlation of forces is
not achieved, they would not begin a war unless their calcula-
tions were favorable. Part of the meaning of deterrence is to
keep the calculations unfavorable, but that is through the threat
of confrontation which carries with it the danger of misinter-
pretation and preemption.
There could be another approach. The newest Soviet doctrine
(and the debate is far from over) is for sufficient defense. 81
In the strategic cultural chess, the U.S. and NATO would show
81 D. T. Yazov, Na strazhe sotsialisma i mira
.
(Moscow: Voen-
izdat, 1987), p. 34. It is significant that General Yazov's
definition of sufficient defense included sufficient strength to
turn to the attack and end the war according to traditional
Soviet doctrine: to destroy the enemy's capability to make war.
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enthusiastic interest in the concept and ask to participate in
the scientific debate and in Soviet planning. The West could
suggest what Soviet force levels could be in order not to appear
aggressive and ask the Soviets to propose the composition of a
purely defensive NATO force, etc.
The difference being suggested here is that war termination
be achieved in advance, on the theoretical level by meeting
Soviet doctrine, absorbing it, gaming it perhaps, and deflecting
it. The object is to recognize that there will always be
conflict, to accept that there can be no winners, and to insure
that neither side is in a position to check the other.
With the new doctrine of designing Soviet forces for no
first use of nuclear weapons, nonprovocative defense, and shaping
the forces to make aggression impossible, the Soviets are already
trying to establish the semiotic signs to insure conflict without
issue. It is a good contest for us to join.
3. Should war come, and more importantly to avoid it, there
needs to be a trained organization established in advance with
which the Soviets would be likely to negotiate. It would be most
effective if it were a mirror-image of the Soviet structure, a
kind of shadow American politburo.
The Soviet reality, repeated at all levels of analysis, is
that the American president and his cabinet are either the
representatives or under the control of monopolistic, ruling
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circles who direct a policy of imperialism. 82 Soviet leaders
seem to be willing to speak to the leading bankers and in-
dustrialists, such as the emeriti David Rockefeller and Thomas J.
Watson, Jr., and assume that they, and others, like them, can
control U.S. policy. Their assumption probably is that should
America plan a first strike, these men could stop it.
It is important, therefore, to have, in advance, some
notion of an arbitration system which both sides could "trust"
and where both cultures would be understood. A shadow American
Politburo could fulfill the function of an emergency bridge, a
role the Occidental Oil president, Armand Hammar, already
fulfills.
From the lessons of strategic culture, we understand that
the level of trust will play a critical role in war termination.
The idea of the threshold between war and peace and then between
conventional war and nuclear war in war termination must be
carefully respected. Crossing the threshold, for the Soviets,
changes the reality to a new set of circumstances with different
control features. Such a shadow politburo could be a final
pressure valve for preventing the crossing of that threshold. .
82 It would be a mistake, it seems to me, to dismiss the
rhetoric which the Soviet Union has promoted since 1917 as mere
propaganda. Although it is propaganda, it defines the context
and structure within which Soviet thought is channeled. See N.
V. Ogarkov, Istoriva , pp. 3-26, for a heated presentation of the
thesis.
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4 . As the great danger of the Soviets starting a war would
be almost exclusively the Politburo's conviction that the U.S.
was about to launch a first strike, it is extremely important in
Russian culture to have multiple levels of reporting. No one
level is trusted. Each must be checked and confirmed by others,
and even then, as in the case of the opening of Operation
Barbarossa, the information may not be believed.
5. As Soviet culture operates slowly from the top down in a
multi-context way that condition enormously increases the
possibilities of prediction for those trained in cross-cultural
analysis. For example, when a new military doctrine is an-
nounced, it follows that the Soviet military hierarchy will first
have to justify it theoretically, develop the military art and
science and from that design the weapons and exercises. During
the transition from the old to the new doctrine, there will be a
very long period of considerable confusion camouflaged by a good
deal of pokazukha (traditional Russian bluster and pretense) and
a flood of theoretical writing in the Manilovshchina (grandilo-
quent) style. This period of enormous confusion for the entire
military establishment can be prolonged through the concept of
intellectual war termination. The point would be to introduce
factors which would, for the Soviets, constantly change the
correlation of forces, geopolitically and ideologically as well
as in terms of weapons and their effects so that their scientific
calculations would always be in a state of incompletion. At the
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very least, the U.S. can take advantage of the relative slowness
of the Soviet bureaucracy.
6. The military must obviously continue developing methods
for conveying signals that the Soviets will understand if it
seriously plans operations like The Maritime Strategy or limited
war of any kind. That involves considerable subtlety in Soviet
political culture. It is also important that we prove, by some
method, that we can control our forces under the various condi-
tions of modern war. Soviet writings indicate that once nuclear
war has begun, they do not believe communications can be reliably
maintained or that the commander can know precisely what is
happening. In case of war termination talks, Soviets will need
assurance that authorities can control their strategic forces.
Under such conditions, as has been argued, the Soviet forces
will be difficult to stop, but they would reliably do so if
orders were received. The Soviets, however, assess American
forces as somewhat uncontrollable. (A Soviet General Patton or
Admiral Rickover is unimaginable.) For war termination, it would
be important to give Soviets convincing evidence that orders
would be carried out under the condition of adequate communica-
tions. 83
Termination Under Perestroyka
A. V. Barabanshchikov, Voennaya pedaqoqika i psikholoq-
iya
.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986,) p. 167, discusses the relative
unreliability of American forces and the discipline and control
of the Soviets.
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The ideological base of the strategic culture of the Soviet
Union is now changing. This is confirmed by a speech by the
Soviet Foreign Minister and Politburo Member, E. Shevarnadze at a
foreign ministry conference on perestroyka . and reported in many
Soviet publications. Quite simply, the new thinking is a
revision of the doctrine that has been fundamental in Soviet
military thought, the doctrine of permanent class struggle. He
said:
If humanity is capable of surviving today solely in
conditions of peaceful coexistence, and it is definite-
ly incapable of ensuring itself a future in the
conditions of permanent confrontation, then should we
not conclude that the rivalry between the two systems
can no longer be viewed as the leading tendency of the
modern age? . . . .The ability to augment material boons
rapidly on the basis of advanced science and engineer-
ing and distribute them fairly, and to restore and
defend through joint efforts the resources needed for
the survival of humanity is becoming a matter of
decisive importance at the present stage. 84
From the same conference, even more fundamental views were
voiced, views which would revise the very foundations of Marxism,
its thesis on the inevitability of class warfare. It was
reported that:
It is all the more strange to talk about the irrecon-
cilable interests of states with different social
systems now that even the class conflicts within
capitalist countries largely take place through the
achievement of compromise within a mutually accepted
legal framework rather than in the form of harsh
confrontation. It follows that the Soviet workers'
solidarity with their class brothers in the West far
84 E. Shevarnadze, "The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference:
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy," International Affairs , no. 10,
1988, p. 15.
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from justifies the thesis of global class confronta-
tion. ^5
The very possibility of the official sanction for such
revisionism, and that they were reported in Pravda makes it" clear
that there are powerful forces operating against the traditional
centralized strategic culture and thought of the Soviet Union.
Inevitably introduced are new ideas about the nature of war, the
international brotherhood of the soldier-proletariat, and the
nature of war termination. The new military doctrine will not,
apparently, seek to impose the Soviet system as a condition for
ending a war.
Scientific planning for war termination must be affected in
other ways. Take just the problem of the enemy. The enemy is
theoretically determined to be the leader of the imperialist
powers which means the economic leader. That, of course, has
been the United States; however, that picture has been confused
by the Japanese economic surge and the transfer of considerable
weight in the economic balance to the Pacific Basin and to
Europe. The Soviet's strategic culture, which orients itself
more to the future than to the present, can no longer concentrate
its planning so heavily on the United States which is being
gradually displaced as the monolithic enemy. In a period of
economic and technological decline, the resurgence of the specter
of the needing of sophisticated strategic defense on two fronts
—
85 A. V. Kozyrev, "Why Soviet Foreign Policy Went Sour,"
adapted from Mezhdunarodnava zhizn' . New York Times . January 7,
1989, p. 17.
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Europe and Asia—must be so alarming that it will necessarily
lead to new alliances.
Second, and related, the Marxist ideology as it was trans-
lated into Soviet strategic culture has become considerably
weakened by the failure of the Soviet system, not only in the
USSR but also in Eastern Europe and China and the success,
without revolution, of alternative socialist models such as in
Scandinavia. Since in Soviet strategic culture, the most
important element is not technology but morale (by which is meant
control of the population's willingness to fight), the decline of
the power of the ideology to define the enemy introduces a new
weakness in Soviet military planning.
New Thinking
Lenin, in the October Revolution, achieved one of the most
extraordinary victories in history, extraordinary, not only
because it turned not only Russia but the whole world upside
down, and it was fought with few weapons but words. That victory
has influenced Soviet military thought to focus on the idea of
the possibility of a cheap victory through the skillful psycho-
logical use of military and political power. When the theory
became too divorced from reality, when Mathais Rust and the
Afghans pointed out the emperor's new clothes, then Soviet
military thought had to be, as it was so often in the past,
reformulated
.
What Gorbachev and his military leaders are now saying is
that Soviet military science has been defeated by the problems of
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the rear. It cannot achieve a socialist victory in modern war.
The problem, as always, is with control. If the spotlight is so
strong that the failures of the rear cannot be hidden, the enemy
cannot be manipulated, then it will not be argued that an
aggressive war can be won. We have pointed out that the Soviets
are a "top-down" culture, one that cannot successfully function
without a strong theoretical umbrella. In order to coordinate
its functions, it must have a dominant "idea". When that idea
weakens, the structure begins to fly apart.
The West now has a chance to terminate the war that has been
inexorably approaching since 1945. Because of their own defeats
and failures, the Soviets have gone into a retrenchment. They
have, in their desperation, adopted programs which come from the
opposite end of their political culture—openness, democracy and
decentralization. Of course, in time, these changes will give
way to a return to the old patterns, however much they are
disguised as new. At that time, the Soviets will have come up
with a new "idea" of how to achieve victory, a new coordinating
doctrine. But in the interim, by shaping programs that capital-
ize on Soviet political and strategic culture, the West has a
chance to help insure the permanent termination of the war the
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